Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers
Metadata
- Publisher
- IETF
- Doc Type
- Standard
- Pages
- 18
- Abstract
- The current Internet climate poses serious threats to the Domain Name System. In the interim period before the DNS protocol can be secured more fully, measures can already be taken to harden the DNS to make 'spoofing' a recursing nameserver many orders of magnitude harder. Even a cryptographically secured DNS benefits from having the ability to discard bogus responses quickly, as this potentially saves large amounts of computation. By describing certain behavior that has previously not been standardized, this document sets out how to make the DNS more resilient against accepting incorrect responses. This document updates RFC 2181. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
- Publication Date
- 2009-01-01
- Status Note
- Proposed Standard
- DOI
10.17487/RFC5452- Link
- https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC5452
- Author(s)
- Bert HubertRemco Mook
- Keyword(s)
- Spoofing
Latest version of IETF RFC 5452
Document Versions — IETF RFC 5452
-
▶ IETF RFC 5452 (2009-01-01)THIS DOC [ACTIVE] [LATEST VERSION]
Normative Reference(s)
- IETF RFC 1034 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 1035 [Active, Amended*]
- IETF RFC 2119 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 2181 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 2827 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 2845 [Superseded*]
- IETF RFC 3013 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 4033 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 4086 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 5321 [Active*]
Bibliographic Reference(s)
- United States CERT, "Various DNS service implementations generate multiple simultaneous queries for the same resource record", VU 457875, November 2002. EXTERNAL
- IETF RFC 1123 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 3833 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 4301 [Active, Amended*]
- RFC4787 — RFC4787 EXTERNAL
- IETF RFC 5358 [Active*]
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IETF RFC 5452, Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers. Available at https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC5452
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IETF RFC 5452, Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers. Available at https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC5452
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IETF RFC 5452, Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers. Available at https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC5452
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<span class="citation"><cite>IETF RFC 5452</cite>, Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers. Available at <a href="https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC5452" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC5452</a></span>
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IETF RFC 5452, Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers
doi: 10.17487/RFC5452
url: https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC5452
doi: 10.17487/RFC5452
url: https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC5452
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<li> <cite id="bib-rfc5452">IETF RFC 5452</cite>, Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers <span class="doi">10.17487/RFC5452</span> </li>
Referenced By
- IETF RFC 9210 [Active*]
- IETF RFC 9520 [Active*]