Protecting Broadcast Infrastructure from GPS Jamming & Spoofing Attacks

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Publisher: SMPTE — Pasadena, CA
Doc Type: Conference Paper
Content Type: Original Research
Volume: 00, pp. 1–19
Abstract: GPS is ubiquitous in our everyday lives and widely used and trusted for navigation and other services. GPS is also the fundamental source of time for most broadcast production and streaming networks. As such, broadcast networks depend on GPS for reliable operation. GPS is vulnerable to a long list of threats, including jamming & spoofing attacks. Jamming and spoofing is on the rise and a variety of technologies exist to protect broadcast infrastructure. The paper will •explain how jamming and spoofing attacks are executed, •share surveys of global jamming and spoofing occurrences, •contrast accidental vs. military or state-sponsored attacks, •introduce technologies and tools to mitigate these problems, •discuss effectiveness of mitigation technologies, and •explain testing methods from in-lab testing to live-sky events. Tools discussed will include: •holdover oscillators, •redundant receivers and remote antennas, •anti-jamming antennas, •terrestrial time transport, •multi-constellation and multi-band receivers, •GNSS consistency checks, •cryptographic authentication, and •alternative PNT sources. The paper will close by explaining how testing is done, share experience from lab & field testing, and recommend an approach to protecting infrastructure.
Publication Date: 2025-10-13
ISBN: [object Object]
Author(s): Allan Armstrong
Leigh Whitcomb
Douglas Arnold
Geshan Wrosinghert
Matt Silver
Mathias Kleinsorge
Daniel Boldt
Heiko Gerstung
Keyword(s): GPS, GNSS, Galileo, OSNMA, Jamming, Spoofing, Resilience, ST 2110, Holdover Oscillator, GET-CI, JammerTest, Live Sky
Copyright: © 2025 SMPTE

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Allan Armstrong, Leigh Whitcomb, Douglas Arnold, Geshan Wrosinghert, Matt Silver, Mathias Kleinsorge, Daniel Boldt, and Heiko Gerstung; Protecting Broadcast Infrastructure from GPS Jamming & Spoofing Attacks, MTS 2025, Article 36 (pp. 1 to 19); SMPTE, 2025, ISBN: [object Object]

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Allan Armstrong, Leigh Whitcomb, Douglas Arnold, Geshan Wrosinghert, Matt Silver, Mathias Kleinsorge, Daniel Boldt, and Heiko Gerstung; Protecting Broadcast Infrastructure from GPS Jamming &amp; Spoofing Attacks, MTS 2025, Article 36 (pp. 1 to 19); SMPTE, 2025, ISBN: [object Object]

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<span class="citation">Allan Armstrong, Leigh Whitcomb, Douglas Arnold, Geshan Wrosinghert, Matt Silver, Mathias Kleinsorge, Daniel Boldt, and Heiko Gerstung; <cite>Protecting Broadcast Infrastructure from GPS Jamming &amp; Spoofing Attacks</cite>, MTS 2025, Article 36 (pp. 1 to 19); SMPTE, 2025, ISBN: [object Object]</span>

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Allan Armstrong, Leigh Whitcomb, Douglas Arnold, Geshan Wrosinghert, Matt Silver, Mathias Kleinsorge, Daniel Boldt, and Heiko Gerstung; <cite id="bib-978-1-61482-966-9-36">Protecting Broadcast Infrastructure from GPS Jamming &amp; Spoofing Attacks</cite>, MTS 2025, Article 36 (pp. 1 to 19); SMPTE, 2025, ISBN: [object Object]
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